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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of
Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1988) and Rule 3(a) R.
Utah Ct. App.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment granted in favor
of plaintiff by Judge Edward A. Watson of the Third Circuit Court
of Salt Lake City, West Valley Department, Case No. 873-000531-CV.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following constitute the significant issues on appeals
1.

Did the trial court commit error by allowing plaintiff to

maintain this action absent plaintiff's compliance with statutory
requirements of pleading and proof?
2.

Did the trial court commit error in granting summary

judgment to plaintiff on the grounds of unjust enrichment?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following Statutes and Rules are believed to be determinative of the respective issues stated:
1. Statutes:
(a)

Utah Code Ann. §58A-l-26 (1981), Utah Code Ann.

§58A-la-13 (1985) and Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) are identical and provide:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of this
state for collection of compensation for the
performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.

2.

Rules:
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. provides:
(c) Motion and Proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadingsf depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone, although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an action on a contract initiated by
plaintiff against defendant in August, 1987, in which plaintiff
seeks judgment in the principal sum of $2,521.00 claimed by plaintiff to be the balance due and owing under the contract sued upon.
(See Amended Complaint, R.16).
On August 30, 1982, the parties entered into a Management
Agreement

(R.3) for the management of that condominium complex

known

the Donner

as

effective

September

Crest Condominium, which
1, 1982.

contract

became

The contract was terminated by

defendant effective November 30f 1986.
During the course of the employment agreement, plaintiff
employed two subcontractors to perform certain services for and on
behalf of defendant: (a) Cover-Pools, Inc., for the installation
of a swimming pool cover on defendant's property in October, 1985,
for which plaintiff

charged defendant $606.70

(R.35); and

(b)

HanDayMen for painting interior walls, railings and other surfaces
at the condominium complex during March and April of 1986, for
which HanDayMen charged plaintiff $2,057.00 and plaintiff in turn
charged defendant the amount of $2,202.00 (R.54,55,101,102 ) .
At no time between August 30, 1982 and November 30, 1986
was plaintiff licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the
Utah Department of Business Regulation, Division of Contractors
(now

known

Licensing)

as

the

(R.56),

Division
nor

were

of

Occupational

Cover-Pools,

and

Inc.

Professional
or

HanDayMen

licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the Utah Department of Business Regulation at the time the services were performed by them at the Donner Crest Condominium. (R.51,52).
Plaintiff filed its original complaint (R«6) in this case
on

August

5, 1987, and

September 11, 1987.

filed

an amended

complaint

(R.16) on

In neither plaintiff's original complaint nor

in plaintiff's amended complaint did plaintiff allege that plaintiff was a properly licensed contractor when the contract sued
upon was entered into and when the cause of action arose.
During the course of the proceedings, the parties submitted

interrogatories and request for production of documents,

following

which

defendant

moved

for

summary

judgment

against

plaintiff essentially on the grounds that since neither plaintiff
nor

its

subcontractors

were

licensed

as

required

by

the

Contractor's Licensing Act (Utah Code Ann. §58-50-1 et seq. 1987)
and its predecessor statutes, the plaintiff could not commence or
maintain this action without alleging and proving that he was a
properly

licensed

contractor

when

the contract

sued

upon was

entered into and when the alleged cause of action arose, and for
the further reason that the contract sued upon by plaintiff is
deemed

void and unenforceable.

Plaintiff's

Motion

thereafter plaintiff

for

Summary

(See Memorandum in Support of
Judgment,

R.62).

Shortly

filed a cross-motion for summary judgment

against defendant in the sum of $2,521.39 representing the balance
due under

the contract.

(See plaintiff's Motion

for Summary

Judgment and Notice of Hearing, R.82).l

The respective motions

were argued before the Honorable Edward A. Watson, Circuit Judge,
on August 16, 1988.
On September 27, 1988, the trial court entered its Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law and entered Judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against defendant for the value of goods and services in the sum of $2,808,70 on grounds of unjust enrichment.
[The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment are
included in the Addendum to this Brief].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR BY
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION
ABSENT PLAINTIFF1S COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADING AND PROOF
The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law correctly found that during the time period

[while the

management contract was in force from September 1, 1982 until
November 30, 1986] plaintiff was not licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the Utah Department of Business Regulation,
Division of Contractors, the statute in effect when the contract
was entered into and the work in question was performed required
plaintiff to be licensed, and the contract between plaintiff and

It should be pointed out that there were no controverted facts by either party.
Further, plaintiff
acknowledged that neither plaintiff, HanDayMen nor
Cover-Pools, Inc. was licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the Division of Contractors.
(See paragraph
4 of
Plaintiff's
Response to
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, R.115,116).

defendant violated the statute which was in place at the time the
contract was entered into (Findings of Fact, K1[2,3,8).

The trial

court correctly concluded that the contract between plaintiff and
defendant was unenforceable
trial court totally

(Conclusions of Law, Hi).

ignored

Yet the

the prohibition of Utah Code Ann.

§58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statutes precluding plaintiff
as acting as agent or commencing or maintaining any action in any
court of this state for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is required, and entered
judgment against defendant in excess of the amount demanded by
plaintiff.

The trial court failed to acknowledge that plaintiff

did not allege and plead that plaintiff was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into and when
the alleged cause of action arose.
allowed

plaintiff

to

maintain

The trial court improperly

his

action

against

defendant

contrary to the statutory mandate requiring plaintiff to allege
and prove that plaintiff was licensed in order to maintain his
action against defendant.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON GROUNDS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In

this

material of fact.
granted
entitled

summary

case

there

was

no genuine

issue as

to any

Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to
judgment

to

plaintiff

judgment as a matter of law.

only

if

plaintiff

was

Defendant alleges that

plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
but, contrarily, defendant was entitled to judgment against plain-

tiff as a matter of law since the Utah Supreme Court has held that
an

unlicensed

contractor

who

was

statutorily

barred

from

collecting compensation on his contract for work done could not
alternatively recover on a theory of unjust enrichment.

Further,

plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
theory

of unjust

enrichment

since plaintiff's

only

claim for

relief in his amended complaint was for the alleged balance due
under the contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ALLOWING PLAINTIFF
TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION ABSENT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLIANCE
WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADING AND PROOF
The current Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statutes deal with a contractor's right to maintain an
action in the courts of this state.

The operative statute in

effect at the time the contract sued upon was entered into was
Utah Code Ann S58A-1-26

(1981), and when plaintiff's cause of

action arose the operative statute was Utah Code Ann. §58A-la-13
(1985).

These sections remain unchanged since the initial adop-

tion in 1981. (2)

Section 58-50-11 provides:

No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of this state
for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is

< 2 ) Utah Code Ann. §58A-l-26, (1981), Enacted Laws 1981
Ch. 23, §26, effective May 12, 1981; Utah Code Ann.
§58A-la-13, (1985), Enacted Laws 1985, Ch. 171, §2,
effective July 1, 1985; Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11,
(1987), Enacted Laws 1987, Ch. 247, §11, effective
July 1, 1987.

required by this Chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose, (Emphasis added).
The
plaintiff

statute

allege

and

is specific
prove

in

that

he

its
was

requirement
a

that the

properly

licensed

contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into and when
the alleged

cause of action arose.

Absent such pleading and

proof, plaintiff cannot maintain this action against defendant
since the contract upon which plaintiff sues is deemed void and
unenforceable.

Olsen vs. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 416, 200 P.2d 733,

736 (1948); Meridian Corporation vs. McGynn-Garmaker Company, 567
P.2d 1110, 1111 (Utah 1977); Fillmore Products, Inc. vs. Western
States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977); George vs.
Oren Ltd. & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1983).
The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law correctly found that during the time period

[while the

management contract was in force from September 1, 1982 until
November 30, 1986], plaintiff was not licensed as a general or
specialty

contractor

by

the

Utah

Department

of

Business

Regulation, Division of Contractors [Findings of Fact, 12]; the
statute in effect when the contract was entered and the work in
question was performed required plaintiff to be licensed [Findings
of Fact, H3]; and that the contract between plaintiff and defendant violates the statute which was in place at the time the
contract was entered

[Findings of Fact, J[8 ] .

The trial court

concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant is

unenforceable

[Conclusions of Lawf Jl].

The court nonetheless

entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on a
theory of unjust enrichment [Conclusions of Law, J2], The trial
court totally ignored the prohibition of Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11
(1987) and

its predecessor

statutes precluding

plaintiff

from

acting as agent or commencing or maintaining any action in any
court of this state for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is required.

The court

failed to acknowledge that plaintiff did not allege and plead that
plaintiff was a properly licensed contractor when the contract
sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of action
arose.
The court

correctly

acknowledged

that the statute in

effect when the contract was entered into and the work in question
was performed required plaintiff to be licensed, that plaintiff
was not licensed as a general or specialty contractor, and that
the contract sued upon was unenforceable, yet the trial court
nonetheless

allowed

plaintiff

to maintain

his

action

against

defendant contrary to the statutory mandate requiring plaintiff to
allege and prove plaintiff was licensed in order to maintain his
action against defendant.

It was manifest error for the trial

court to ignore the statutory prohibition precluding plaintiff
from maintaining this action.
II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON GROUNDS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

[Summary] Judgment . . . shall be rendered
forthwith
if
the
pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
(Emphasis added).
In
material

this

fact.

case

there

was

no genuine

issue as

to any

Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to

grant summary judgment to plaintiff only if plaintiff was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff

was not entitled to summary judgment as as matter of law.
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has held that Utah statutes requiring the licensing of contractors are for the protection of the public.

Olsen vs. Reese, op.cit.; George vs. Oren

Ltd. & Associates, op.cit.; Fillmore Products, Inc. vs. Western
States Paving, Inc., op.cit.; Ecklund vs. Elwell, 116 Utah 521,
211 P.2d 849 (1949).

The Utah Supreme Court also has held that an

unlicensed contractor who was statutorily barred from collecting
compensation on his contract for work done could not alternatively
recover on a theory of unjust enrichment.

Wilderness Building

Systems, Inc. vs. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985).
In a case involving a statute requiring well drillers to
secure and maintain annual permits, the Utah Supreme Court has
held

that

such statute is designed

for the protection of the

people of this State, and that one who drills a well in Utah
without first securing such permit cannot recover for work done,
either on a contract or on a theory of quantum meruit.
Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969).

Mosely vs.

The court stated:

We are unable to see why this plaintiff, whose
contract is void, should be able to recover on
the theory of quantum meruit. To permit him to
do so would permit him to evade the law and
recover for work which he was forbidden to pursue.
If he got the reasonable value of his
services, he might even prove more than his
contract would have given him had it been
valid.
* * *

Where a contract is unenforceable by one of the
parties thereto by reason of his noncompliance
with a license . . . law, such party may not
recover for services which he has performed
under such contract.
453 P.2d at 151.
It is obvious that the statute . . .
is
designed for the protection of the people of
this State, and the one who drills a well in
Utah without first securing an annual permit
cannot recover in the courts of this State for
the work done, either on a contract or on a
theory of quantum meruit.
* * *

The court will no more assist one who fails to
secure a required license to recover money by
means of a lien foreclosure than it will in an
action on the contract or on a theory of quantum meruit.
Id at 152.
Based on the prior holdings of the Utah Supreme Court,
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a
theory of unjust enrichment, a theory which was not pleaded by
plaintiff

in

plaintiff's

initial

or

amended

Complaint. (R.6;

R.16) .
It would appear that the trail court failed to view all
of the facts and circumstances in a light most favorable to defendant in defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, a
entitled.
(Utah

view

by

the

trial

court

to which defendant

was

Amjacs Interwest, Inc. vs. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53

1981);

Bihlmaier

vs. Carson, 603 P.2d

790

(Utah

1979);

Norton vs. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Bowen vs. Riverton City,
656 P.2d 434 (1987); B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. vs. Collins
Food Services, Inc., 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988).
The trial court should have denied plaintiff's motion for
summary

judgment

judgment.

and

granted

defendant's

motion

for

summary

Defendant moved for summary judgment essentially on the

grounds that since neither plaintiff nor his subcontractors were
licensed as required by law the contract sued upon was void and
unenforceable, and plaintiff was prohibited from maintaining his
action by Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statutes . Assuming the trial court viewed all of the facts and circumstances in a light most favorable to plaintiff in considering
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court nonetheless should have granted judgment to defendant as a matter of law.
The trial court awarded plaintiff judgment against defendant in the total principal sum of $2,808.70 (Judgment, Hi), yet
plaintiff

only

requested

judgment

in

its

initial

and

amended

complaint in the sum of $2,521.39 (See fA of Prayer for Relief,
Complaint,
(R.15)).

(R.5); flA of Prayer for Relief, Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff admitted that the balance claimed to be due

under the contract was $2,521.39 (See Affidavit of John Holland,
59 (R.85); 55, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice
of Hearing (R.8D).

There is absolutely nothing in the record to

record to support the judgment awarded plaintiff in the sum of
$2,808.70.
Defendant asserts it was manifest error for the court to
deny defendant's motion for summary judgment and grant plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on grounds of unjust enrichment, and
in an amount not supported by the record.(3)

CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the trial court committed manifest
error in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against defendant.

Not only did the trial court ignore the man-

date of Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statutes, but also the trial court committed error in awarding summary
judgment to plaintiff on grounds of unjust enrichment since the
case law prevents recovery either on contract or on a theory of
quantum meruit.
Defendant urges this court to reverse the judgment of the
trial court and order entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant .

(3)

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the
management contract only and not on grounds
of quantum meruit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 1989.

WARREN M. WEGGEliAND
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Wendy G. Bates, #4270
Attorney for Plaintiff
4126 South 3055 West
West Valley City, Utah
Telephone: 966-2253
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
JOHN HOLLAND DBA PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 873-000531-CV

DONNER CREST HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
Plaintiff's and defendant's respective Motions for Summary
Judgment came on regularly for hearing on Tuesday, August 16,
1988, the honorable Edward A. Watson presiding.

Plaintiff

appeared through counsel, Wendy G. Bates and defendant appeared
through counsel, Warren M. Weggeland.

Having listened to the

arguments of counsel and considered the memoranda on file, and
good cause appearing, the court enters the following Judgment
based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
herein:
1.

The plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant

in the total principal sum of $2,808.70.
2.

No interest shall be awarded to date of judgment, but

plaintiff is awarded interest from the date of judgment until
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Valley City, Utah:
Warren M. Weggeland, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
850 Donner Way #403
P. 0. Box 8022
Salt Lake City, Utah
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